

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 134863
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
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DRAFTED BY:IO/UNA:BJSHARP
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 134863

EXDIS - FOR AMB. YOUNG FROM UNA

C O R R E C T E D COPY(MRN 134863 VICE 134683)

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 134683 ACTION MOSCOW AMEMBASSY BERLIN BUDAPEST
BUCHAREST PRAGUE SOFIA WARSAW BELGRADE INFO USMISSION USNATO MAY 26.

QUOTE:C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 134863

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, MBFR, PINT, CZ, UR, HU, CH, RO, SOCI, ECON, XW, MPOL

SUBJECT: THOUGHTS OF JANOS BERECH, HUNGARIAN PARTY
OFFICIAL DURING HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES

1. SUMMARY: BERECH, FIRST SENIOR HUNGARIAN PARTY OFFICIAL
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S/S-O:KDSCOTT

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, MBFR, PINT, CZ, UR, HU, CH, RO, SOCI, ECON, XW, MPOL

SUBJECT: THOUGHTS OF JANOS BEREZ, HUNGARIAN PARTY
OFFICIAL DURING HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES
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1. SUMMARY: BEREZ, FIRST SENIOR HUNGARIAN PARTY OFFICIAL TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES, FASCINATED MANY OF HIS LISTENERS. BEREZ IS A CONFIDENT AND INTELLECTUALLY ALERT COMMUNIST OFFICIAL. HE SPOKE FREELY AND OPENLY ON A NUMBER OF CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES: RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, INDIVIDUALS IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, THE SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY, PROBLEMS WITH THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN ROMANIA, AND EUROCOMMUNISM. DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON, HE HAD SEVERAL PLATFORMS INCLUDING AN INFORMAL SESSION WITH GOVERNOR HARRIMAN, LONG CHATS WITH COUNSELOR NIMETZ AND DR. SHULMAN AND SESSIONS ON THE HILL. FOLLOWING ARE SOME OF HIS COMMENTS. END SUMMARY.

2. BEREZ IS THE SENIOR PARTY OFFICIAL DEALING WITH FOREIGN POLICY. HE IS A YOUNG-LOOKING 48 YEARS OLD. HE DOES NOT SPEAK ENGLISH BUT UNDERSTANDS IT. HIS POLISH AND POISE IS UNUSUAL FOR THOSE WHO HAVE DEALT WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNISTS. HIS WILLINGNESS TO SPEAK QUITE FRANKLY ON A WIDE VARIETY OF SUBJECTS WAS SURPRISING.

3. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. BEREZ SAID THAT HUNGARIAN PRACTICES DIFFER FROM SOVIET PRACTICES, BUT THAT HUNGARY DOES NOT WISH TO DRAW PUBLIC ATTENTION TO THESE CONTRASTS. HE REMINDED HIS LISTENERS THAT RUSSIAN CONCERN FOR THEIR SECURITY HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN AN OVERRIDING FACTOR IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. AS LONG AS THE RUSSIANS CAN CONSIDER RELATIONS TO BE STABLE AND SECURE, DIFFERENCES IN INTERNAL PRACTICES AND EVEN OVER FOREIGN POLICIES BECOME LESS OF A PROBLEM. WHILE DEVELOPING INTERNAL POLICIES DIFFERENT FROM THE SOVIET UNION, THE HUNGARIANS MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT TO PROMOTE AN ATMOSPHERE OF FRIENDSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION.
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4. SOVIET LEADERSHIP. BEREZ SAID THAT HE IS NOT CONCERNED ABOUT SUCCESSION WITHIN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. BREZHNEV IS FLEXIBLE BUT THERE IS ENOUGH FLEXIBILITY IN THOSE WHO FOLLOW HIM TO CONTINUE THE GENERAL POLICIES OF BREZHNEV. HE

SAID THAT KADAR HAS CONTINUED TO HAVE A SPECIAL INFLUENCE ON BREZHNEV'S DECISIONS AND BREZHNEV RESPECTS KADAR'S PROPOSALS AND IDEAS ON DEALING WITH FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS, AND INTRA-PARTY QUESTIONS. WHEN ASKED WHO IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WERE THE MOST INTERESTING. BEJCZ MOST SURPRISINGLY GAVE HIS VIEWS ON SEVERAL OF THE LEADERS. HE SAID THAT PARTY SECRETARY DOLGIKH IS THE MOST FLEXIBLE AND INTERESTING PARTY OFFICIAL WHO PROBABLY HAS A BRIGHT FUTURE AND WHO WORKS WELL WITH THE HUNGARIANS. HE SAID THAT KATUSHEV IS KNOWN AS THE "HOUSE HUNGARIAN" WITHIN THE SOVIET PARTY. KATUSHEV HAS ALWAYS WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE HUNGARIANS AND SYMPATHIZES WITH MANY OF THE APPROACHES THE HUNGARIAN PARTY HAS TAKEN. BEREZ ALSO HAD PRAISE FOR PRAVDA EDITOR AFANASYEV WHO IS ONE OF THE MORE "FLEXIBLE" SENIOR OFFICIALS. AT ONE POINT BEREZ HAD CRITICIZED AFANASYEV FOR A CONSERVATIVE EDITORIAL THAT APPEARED IN PRAVDA. AFANASYEV REPLIED TO BEREZ THAT HE WAS IN MADRID AT THE TIME BUT HAD HE BEEN IN MOSCOW IT NEVER WOULD HAVE HAPPENED.

5. MARXISM/LENINISM. WHEN ASKED WHAT HE THOUGHT ABOUT MARXISM/LENINISM, BEREZ REPLIED THAT LENIN DIED IN 1924 AND HAS HAD NOTHING TO SAY ON THE PROBLEMS OF EUROPE SINCE THAT TIME. HE STATED VERY CLEARLY THAT THE PROBLEMS OF SOCIALISM IN HUNGARY HAVE MOVED BEYOND LENIN AND THAT THE PARTY CANNOT BE HELD TO A DOGMA THAT DOES NOT APPLY TO MODERN PROBLEMS. WHEN ONE OF HIS INTERLOCUTORS TRIES TO DISCUSS SOME OF THE INTERESTING ASPECTS OF STALIN WITH BEREZ, BEREZ REPLIED THAT IT WAS FOR OTHERS TO SAY NICE THINGS ABOUT STALIN. HE HAD NOTHING POSITIVE TO SAY ABOUT STALIN.

6. CHINA. BEREZ ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT U.S. ATTITUDES
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TOWARD CHINA. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT CHINA WOULD BE INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS TO THE SOVIET UNION, TO COUNTRIES OF ASIA AND TO THE THIRD WORLD. HE SAID THAT HE EXPECTED THAT THE CHINESE ARE BECOMING MORE ENGAGED IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND WOULD NOT BE TURNING TOWARD A HARDER LINE INTERNALLY. BUT THEY WOULD BE MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT FOR OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD TO DEAL WITH.

7. US-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS. BEREZ BELIEVED RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES WERE DEVELOPING SATISFACTORILY. THE U.S. SHOULD NOT EXPECT HUNGARY TO COURT THE U.S., HOWEVER, AND RELATIONS WOULD HAVE TO DEVELOP AT THEIR OWN PACE. HE SUGGESTED STRONGLY THAT THE INITIATIVES FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS (INCLUDING HIGH-LEVEL INVITATIONS) NEEDED TO COME FROM THE U.S. WHICH HAD MANY INTERESTS IN EASTERN EUROPE AS A GREAT POWER. HUNGARY (WITH AN EYE TO THE SOVIET UNION) COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO TAKE MAJOR INITIATIVES ON ITS PART SINCE IT IS A SMALLER COUNTRY WITH LESS FARREACHING INTERESTS.

8. EUROCOMMUNISM. BERECZ WAS ASKED ABOUT EUROCOMMUNISM ON WHICH HE IS SOMEWHAT OF AN AUTHORITY. HE REPLIED THAT THERE IS NO "UROCOMMUNISM", ONLY "EUROCOMMUNISTS". HE SAID THAT CENTRALIZATION OF CONTROL OF PARTIES IS OVER. DECISIONS IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT CAN NO LONGER BE BASED ON DICWTION OR ON MAJORITY RULE, ONLY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSENSUS. COUNTRIES CANNOT BE ASKED TO SUBORDINATE NATIONAL INTERESTS TO CTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES. EACH PARTY, WHETHER IT IS A RULING PARTY OR A NON-GOVERNMENT PARTY IS INDEPENDENT TO JOOIN OR NOT TO JOIN A CONSENSUS OR AGREEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES.

9. RELATIONS WITH ROMANIA. BERECZ FREELY ACKNOWLEDGED CONFIDENTIAL

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THAT THE PROBLEMS OF THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN ROMANIA WAS OF GROWING CONCERN WITHIN HUNGARY AND WITHIN THE PARTY. SINCE SEPTEMBER ABOUT HALF OF ALL OF THE QUESTIONS ASKED IN "FREE PARTY SESSIONS" WERE ABOUT ROMANIA. QUESTIONS AROSE SUCH AS: WHY ARE MARRIAGE REGISTERS REMOVED FROM VILLAGES?; WHY ARE CHURCH LIBRARIES TAKEN AWAY FROM CHURCHES?; WHY CAN'T HUNGARIANS STAY WITH COUSINS IN ROMANIA, WHY MUST THEY STAY IN HOTELS? HE CITED STATISTICS. WHEREAS A MILLION HUNGARIANS VISITED CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND ONE-HALF MILLION CZECHS VISITED HUNGARY LAST YEAR, THE EXCHANGE OF VISITS WITH ROMANIA WAS MUCH LESS--100,000 ROMANIANS VISITING HUNGARY AND ONLY 200,000 HUNGARIANS VISITING ROMANIA. HE USED THIS AS AN EXAMPLE OF PROBLEMS OF INTER-ACTION BETWEEN HUNGARY AND ROMANIA. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT AGREEMENT ON OPENING A NEW HUNGARIAN CONSULATE GENERAL IN CLUJ HAS BEEN PENDING FOR NEARLY TWO MONTHS AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE RECENT UNCERTAINTY OVER THIS ISSUE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

10. CZECHOSLOVAKIA. BERECZ SAID THAT THE SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA COULD DEVELOP,PARTICULARLY AFTER THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, ALONG THE LINES OF KADAR'S HUNGARY. HE SAID THIS WAS GOING TO BE A DIFFICULT ANNIVERSARY. WHEN THE PARTY LEADERSHIP GETS THROUGH THIS YEAR, IT MAY BE CAPABLE OF AND RECEPTIVE TO SOME IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THAT HUSAK IS BY NO MEANS THE CONSERVATIVE WITHIN THE CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY. HE REFUSED TO COMMENT ON WHO WAS ACTUALLY HOLDING BACK HUSAK'S LEAD, BUT HE SAID THAT HUSAK WAS BASICALLY SUPPORTED BY THE SOVIET UNION. HE SAID THAT AFTER 1968, HUSAK ON TWO OCCASIONS SET A FLEXIBLE LINE WHICH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY REJECTED. FIRST HIS SPEECH DIRECTED TO THE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA SEPTEMBER 1971 WAS A CLEAR INDICATION OF HIS DESIRE TO RE-ESTABLISH SOME RAPPORT WITH THE INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY. SECONDLY, HIS PROPOSAL AT THE PARTY CONG-

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RESS IN 1976 TO REINCORPORATE INTO THE PARTY THOSE WHO HAD BEEN EXPELLED AFTER 1968 WAS ANOTHER GESTURE TOWARD ESTABLISHING A CONSENSUS WITHIN THE PARTY AND THE COUNTRY. BOTH OF THESE WERE REJECTED ULTIMATELY WITH A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE POSITION OF THE PARTY WITHIN THE COUNTRY. DRAWING ON ANALOGY TO HUNGARY AFTER 1956, HE SAID THAT KADAR HAD BEEN WISE ENOUGH TO CONTROL BOTH THE RIGHT AND LEFT WINGS OF THE PARTY, WHEREAS THE PROBLEMS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA SINCE 1968 HAD STEMMED FROM THE FACT THAT ALL THE ATTENTION WAS DEVOTED TO ELIMINATION OF THE LEFT WING OF THE PARTY, LEAVING THE "RIGHT WING SECTARIANS" TO DOMINATE THE PARTY. THIS HAS BEEN A NEGATIVE HERITAGE FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA. BEREZ WAS, HOWEVER, CONVINCED THAT AFTER THIS YEAR THERE WILL BE IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITIES, ALTHOUGH DEVELOPMENTS WILL BE SLOW.

11. CSCE. BEREZ SAID THAT HUNGARY JUDGED THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE MORE POSITIVELY THAN SOME OF ITS FRIENDS WHO THOUGHT IT WAS A COMPLETE FIASCO. HE AGREED WITH OUR VIEW THAT THE MADRID MEETING WILL REQUIRE MORE PREPARATION THAN BELGRADE. HE SAID THE DOOR IS OPEN FOR BILATERAL EFFORTS TO PREPARE FOR MADRID.

12. SOVIET TROOPS IN HUNGARY. BEREZ THOUGHT THAT MBFR AND TROOP REDUCTIONS MAY HAVE TO PROCEED SO THAT EVENTUALLY IF AN MBFR AGREEMENT IS REACHED, HUNGARY CAN DISCUSS THE STATUS OF SOVIET FORCES WITHIN HUNGARY ON A BILATERAL

BASIS. IF THIS WERE TO BE DONE, HUNGARY WOULD EXPECT TO SEE SOME REDUCTION IN ITALIAN FORCES AS WELL. HE SAID THE SOVIETS WERE PRESUMABLY STATIONED IN HUNGARY BECAUSE OF NATO ROCKET MISSILE BASES IN NORTHERN ITALY, TARGETTED ON HUNGARY.

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13. ECONOMIC REFORM. BEREZ GAVE A DETAILED HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE NEM. THE OCTOBER CENTRAL COMMITTEE SESSION SET FORTH TWO MAJOR TASKS: TO CHANGE THE STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION IN THE DIRECTION OF MORE EFFICIENT ECONOMIC PRODUCTION AND TO MODIFY PRODUCER AND CONSUMER PRICES TO EXPRESS REAL VALUE. THE FIRST WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN A 10-15 YEAR PROGRAM; THE SECOND WOULD HAVE NO DEADLINE, BUT EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS 2-3 YEARS OF INTERNAL DEBATE OVER THE MEASURES TO BE TAKEN AND 1-2 YEARS TO EXPLAIN THESE MEASURES TO THE PEOPLE IN ADVANCE OF PUTTING THEM INTO EFFECT.

14. HORN OF AFRICA. BEREZ TRIED TO EXPLAIN THE SOVIET

ROLE IN THE HORN AS ONE IN WHICH THE SOVIETS STARTED OUT
BY TRYING TO ACT AS BROKER AND PRESSING FOR A PEACEFUL
POLITICAL SOLUTION. BUT THEY DID NOT GET SUFFICIENT HELP
FROM OTHERS.

15. COMMENT: DEPARTMENT WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENTS FROM
ADDRESSEES ON POSSIBLE MOTIVES OF BEREZ AND SUBSTANCE OF
HIS REMARKS. VANCE
UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER UNQUOTE VANCE

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